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Abstract
Marketing is traditionally associated with expanding the market for a branded product in  order  to
increase profit; brands undertake research to ensure they possess a thorough understanding  of  the
consumer, their wants and needs. We would all perhaps expect  that  the  brand  that  is  closest  to
their consumers, most on the pulse of the market, would be expected also to be the most profitable
within  a  competitive  marketplace.  While  a  simplification  of  marketing,   this   highlights   the
important irony with political marketing; that while marketing increases in use  and  sophistication
within political campaigning and communication, voter disengagement rises contiguously.
Data collected during the 2005 UK General Election, and a long  term  study  within  the  political
parties’ heartlands, allows us to understand the nature and causes of political  disengagement,  and
see why marketing is one root cause. The segmentation of  voters,  and  targeting  of  those  voters
who can  deliver  the  greatest  profit,  a  victory  in  a  marginal  seat,  leaves  the  majority  of  the
electorate metaphorically  out  in  the  cold  feeling  unrepresented  and  marginalized.  Through  a
comparison of attitudes within a safe and marginal Labour seat  we  find  the  dichotomy  between
opinions is stark on questions of representation, efficacy of the democratic process and  interest  in
politics. This dichotomy filters  through  to  voting  behavior  and  attachment  to  the  parties  and
candidates and will often argue that they will only  turn  out  to  vote  if  they  are  asked  and  that
support is deserved.
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The conundrum at the heart of professional campaigning
There is a conundrum at the heart of the modern political process, one which particularly relates to
the connection between the citizen and the elected  political  institutions;  that  while  the  political
parties are increasing their uses of marketing concepts and tools throughout their  behavior  public
disengagement  is  growing  and  deepening.  While  political  marketing,  as  this   is   defined,   is
suggested to be the route for reconnecting politics to the  people;  there  is  a  reverse  effect  being
witnessed. Hence predictions that heralded political marketing to be the means by  which  political
institutions would become more in touch, providing the  things  that  the  citizen  requires,  and  so
being recognized as offering a range  of  desirable  products  at  election  times  (Lees-Marshment,
2001) seem rather flawed and their exponents misguided. However,  I  do  not  suggest  that  those
who viewed  political  marketing  as  the  panacea  for  public  mistrust  and  disengagement  were
erroneous  in  making  these  suggestions.  The  problem  we  recognize  at  the  heart  of   political
marketing  is  the  difference  between  what  it  is  and  what  it  could  be;  the  actual  versus  the
normative. Normatively political marketing is suggested  to  involve  a  process  by  which  parties
discover the electorate’s key needs and wants and offer a range of policies that will deliver to their
requirements. While this implicitly means parties must build greater connections with voters using
more of a bottom up  approach  to  politics  as  opposed  to  elite-oriented  decision  making.   The
problem is that a comprehensive study of political marketing  at  the  UK  2005  General  Election
(Lilleker et al, 2006) found that marketing as a philosophy that places the customer or voter first is
practiced at best patchily, and the stress is placed  on  designing  effective  communication  to  sell
bland catch-all policy statements; therefore there is little sense of politics following  a  true  model
of marketing.
Studies of political marketing in non-Anglo-American contexts can find huge positives in pursuing a more grass roots
approach, where the party and their leader are  organic  to  the  community  who  offers  them  votes.  Cotrim-Maceira
(2005) argues that the ongoing success of Brazilian President Lula da Silva is due to the combination of  his  down  to
earth, man of the people image and matching opinion-led program reform he provided both the style and policies  that
the Brazilian voters were seeking. Arguably Tony Blair in the UK in 1997 (Lees-Marshment,  2001;  Lees-Marshment
& Lilleker, 2005), and George W Bush in the USA in 2000 (Knuckey & Lees-Marshment, 2005),  did  just  the  same;
however, both honeymoons were short lived and accompanied by a collapse in turnout at elections.  While  one  could
point to a number of reasons for this, many of which can be related to  the  professionalisation  of  politics  and
its attendant communication, this paper focuses upon one  small  but  highly  significant  area:  the
political view of the electorate as a marketplace and the  strategic  targeting  of  voters.  While  the
research is drawn from two studies of the UK, the core argument relates to any nation  where  first
past the post elections take place and where electoral success depends upon victory in  geographic
areas where support is divided between two of  the  major  contenders  but  where  the  margin  for
victory is close. This paper notes that the within the UK marginal seats, and indeed the  US  swing
states, participation in elections is higher, voters are more engaged and informed and the contest is
seen as important. But this scene of democracy thriving is notable for its scarcity; hence this paper
suggests that elsewhere we find lower turnout, disengagement and a lack of enthusiasm or interest
within electoral contests. It is this disparity that this paper explores, so linking political  marketing
to political disengagement, and explains theoretically why  voting  patterns  are  linked  closely  to
campaign energy.
Campaign strategy in two horse races
It is simply a truism  to  talk  of  the  evolving  professionalisation  of  campaigning  strategy  over
recent decades (Norris, 2000). We are also aware of the  fact  that  there  is  no  longer  one  single
election campaign, but a  number  of  interlinked  campaigns  running  parallel  with  one  another.
Gaber (2006) notes of the 2005 UK General  Election  three  distinct  campaigns,  one  targeted  at
individual voters by the mass parties, a further campaign run nationally through the broadcast  and
print media, while at  the  local  level  candidates  were  encouraged  to  reach  as  many  voters  as
possible using all media and resources available to them. It is two of the strands  of  the  campaign
this paper focuses upon, the national targeted communication and the campaign at the  local  level.
These are not mass campaigns, but in the UK in 2005 more strategically targeted than ever before.
The national parties used personal letters, telephone calls, emails  and  doorstep  visits  to  talk  to,
according  to  some  estimates,  no  more  than  approximately  741,000  voters,  2%  of  the   total
electorate (Savigny, 2005). These voters lived in seats with the narrowest of  electoral  margins  at
the  previous  contest,  they  had  no  real  loyalty  to  any  party,  research  suggested  they  had   a
propensity to vote for the party contacting them and they could be swayed  by  communication  on
issues relevant to them, and importantly they were statistically likely to  actually  vote.  The  party
faithful, non-voters or those living in seats deemed as safe received communication  via  the  mass
media only, some direct in the form of advertisements, broadcasts  and  possibly  a  single  leaflet;
more likely their information was mediated via news or editorials. Hence this suggests a  cleavage
between information haves and have-nots; the majority being excluded from  any  more  advanced
form of participation beyond being audiences to  the  campaign  and  voters,  possibly,  on  polling
day.
This targeting is not designed  to  exclude  voters  from  active  participation  in  the  contest;  it  is
simply following the logic of economics and  the  marketplace.  In  the  UK  finances  dictate  how
what resources are available to each of  the  parties  for  their  election  campaigning.  Both  major
parties commonly bankrupt themselves in the process of trying to be elected; equally they  attempt
to gain funds from as many sources as possible, this practice often leads to serious question  being
asked and, following the 2005 election, a police enquiry into whether  donations  were  exchanged
for honors. This environment necessitates that scant resources are targeted for maximum benefit.
The conundrum which resides at the heart of the strategy is  that  strategists  appear  aware  of  the
importance of local campaigning and the targeting of messages to individuals. This was suggested
during interviews with candidates and their agents within three  marginal  UK  seats,  members  of
the  Conservative,  Labour  and  Liberal  Democrat  campaign  teams  and   was   reinforced   in   a
statement made by UK Premier Tony Blair  speaking  at  a  briefing  at  Labour’s  headquarters  in
February 2005, instructed candidates that face-to-face contact with  the  voters  would  be  vital  to
“inspire,  enthuse  and  engage  and  give  the  public  a  sense   of   empowerment”   (BBC   News
(www.bbc.co.uk/news/1/hi/uk_politics/4272741.stm   accessed   17   February   2005).   A   senior
Conservative went slightly further: “the only way to get voters interested  and  engaged  is  talk  to
them, either on their doorsteps, in letters or on our websites about things that matter  to  them  and
offer them a solution they find plausible and attractive and that they will be able to see happen and
will deliver to them what they want (Interview, June 2005).  While  this  suggests  adherence  to  a
marketing philosophy, party strategists all admitted that  the  voters  they  sought  to  engage  with
were a narrow minority.
The criteria described above, of the disloyal voters within key geographical battle zones,  matched
each party’s target for their  election  communication.  Only  the  Liberal  Democrats  argued  they
encouraged the long term “nursing of all out seats” though this is due to  the  recognition  that  the
party on the whole does not have truly safe seats. However the Liberal Democrats resources  were
largely put behind their  decapitation  strategy,  aimed  at  unseating  senior  Conservative  MPs;  a
strategy that one Liberal Democrat agent argued lost  them  Guildford  as  “Sue  Doughty  [Liberal
Democrat MP until the 2005 Election]  had  half  the  resources  that  Anne  Milton  [Conservative
victor in 2005] did”, equally he argued that the decapitation strategy served  to  also  mobilise  the
Conservative faithful;  hence  the  strategy  targeted  resources  in  the  wrong  places.  Asked  if  a
campaign should try to mobilise all voters, all strategists argued  this  was  impossible  and  that  it
was the role of television to perform that task. A Labour agent  made  this  point  most  succinctly:
“what is the point of wasting time and money asking someone to vote for  you  who  will  anyway,
or lives somewhere that enough vote for you or one of the other lot that it doesn’t  matter,  or  who
isn’t going to vote anyway;  none  that’s  the  point”  (Interview,  May  2005).  Thus  sophisticated
marketing software was used to stratify voters by voting behaviour and propensity to vote and  for
those whose names came out who lived in the marginal seats the campaign  was  brought  to  them
using every means available. It appears therefore that while an election may be  about  democracy,
he campaign is not; all voters are not equal and not all votes have  same  value  in  the  UK  or  US
political marketplace.
The mobilized and engaged minority: scenes from the marginals
This section draws on a questionnaire distributed  one  week  of  the  2005  UK  General  Election,
May 6th-11th, and nine focus groups which took place in June 2005. The  project  was  designed  to
test for campaign and incumbency  effects  within  marginal  constituencies  and  used  three  local
seats, Mid Dorset, Dorset  South  and  Dorset  West.  The  key  results  were  published  elsewhere
(Lilleker, 2005a, 2006), however other interesting data were collected that build a reasonably  rich
picture of voter engagement in seats where the campaign was most intense.
The first important point to make, drawing purely on the quantitative data, was  the  high  level  of
recall for communication from the two  main  competitors.  The  incumbent  received  the  highest
recall, on average 96% across all three seats, however this  was  only  marginally  higher  than  the
main competitor who all averaged 89%. Notably third  placed  candidates  gained  little  recall,  as
they did not really have a campaign, however the Green candidate in Dorset West,  UKIP  in  Mid
Dorset and the RESPECT candidate in Dorset South averaged 20%, higher  than  the  third  placed
candidates, and a not insignificant level considering their lack of  resources  and  little  chances  of
winning. Of more importance is that the  main  communication  recalled  was  firstly  leaflets,  the
staple form of communication in an intense  localized  battle,  but  secondly  actually  meeting  the
candidates. Exactly half of all respondents met at least one of  the  candidates;  just  under  a  third
met both main contenders. The strong correlation between having face to  face  interaction  with  a
candidate and then voting for that candidate is strong  at  60%  and  highly  significant,  indicating
that  this  type  of  campaigning  is  highly  successful  and  the  ability  to  be  present  across   the
constituency can be a key element to winning these contests.  Incumbents  all  had  the  advantage,
the reason not campaign related but due to their long term profile building activities.  Independent
of voting behavior, incumbents within these seats were rated highly for performing their duties  as
a local representative, on average they were scored seven out of  ten  with  Dorset  South  MP  Jim
Knight earning an average of 9.8. This score was  founded  upon  ongoing  communication  which
was backed up by the more intense election  campaigning.  Hence  we  see  that  the  high  activity
campaigning  is  recognized  by  voters  locally  and  that  there  seem  to  be  high  rewards  for   a
candidate who works hard on the ground.
The attitudes which are  encouraged  among  voters  are  the  more  significant  element  for  the  development  of  the
argument of this paper.  In  focus  groups  the  self-selecting  volunteers  demonstrated  their  possession  of  generally
cynical attitudes towards politics generally. Consistent with the generally  rehearsed  negative  attitudes,  these  voters
argue the parties are insufficiently dissimilar, that party  leaders  seek  personal  power,  fame  and  fortune,  that  their
promises can not generally be trusted and that politics is generally  not  worthy  of  great  consideration.  Most  of  the
voters who participated in this stage of the research watched television news, read a local or national paper reasonably
frequently but none were the political anoraks that actively seek out political information; consistent
with Stephen Coleman’s dichotomy of younger voters they are more likely to seek information on
Big Brother, or at least non-political news items, than be monitoring  activity  in  the  Westminster
village.  Yet,  during  the  2005  General  Election  they  accumulated   a   significant   amount   of
information concerning both the main candidates, were interested in the contest  and  its  outcome,
were keen to register their vote and stayed up to watch the result  which  was  greeted  with  either
disappointment or joy.
The reason for the fact that unlike  many  UK  voters  here  was  enthusiasm  and  excitement  was
firstly the closeness of the contest generally, so every vote mattered and a greater importance  was
placed in participating; this was shown by the higher turnout across all three  constituencies,  71%
as opposed to the broad national average  of  59%.  Secondly  however  was  the  attitude  that  the
outcome of the contest mattered to them personally. Many participants argued that  the  incumbent
deserved to be re-elected; equally those who voted  for  the  opposing  candidate  said  they  would
prefer a Conservative of Liberal Democrat MP and believed that  candidate  would  make  a  good
MP. While many comments could be examples of post hoc rationalization of voting  behavior  the
fact that both the qualitative and quantitative data reinforced the dual importance of  both  national
and local factors, local  factors  being  those  relating  to  the  candidate  as  a  representative,  it  is
suggestive that the choice in he ballot box was determined by both general political factors as well
as elements determined by the campaign.
Furthermore, the campaign  had  the  effect  of  mobilizing  many  of  the  voters.  One  participant
argues that she “probably wouldn’t have bothered voting if the MP hadn’t come to my door”,  this
factor was shared by others who had “never met an MP before”  or,  more  importantly,  “no-one’s
ever asked me for my vote personally before”. Equally, the face  to  face  communication  allowed
voters to interact with candidates on the issues important to them. One voter met  both  candidates
in Dorset West, it was the fact that MP Oliver  Letwin  could  not  make  any  direct  statement  on
party  policy  towards  supporting  the  disabled  while  his  Liberal  Democrat   opponent   Justine
McGuinness could point to actual achievements by the party  in  the  area  of  disabled  rights  and
benefits that swung her vote. By the same token, Letwin’s support  for  a  special  bus  service  for
pensioners in rural areas to  Dorchester  hospital  earned  him  support.  Mid  Dorset  MP  Annette
Brooke won support for her ability to articulate the proposals for Local Tax  Reforms  and  getting
police onto the streets, building on her long term campaigning. These  are  all  evidence  of  voters
finding the election communication relevant to them and being  able  to  ask  questions  personally
and test their candidates on the issues that matter to them.  Those  with  these  experiences  argued
the media never ask the right questions, and that they want to know how each candidate  will  help
them personally at the local level.  Consistent  with  the  view  of  the  parties  as  offering  similar
products, one voter argued that “on the big policies they [the parties]  are  pretty  much  the  same,
but whether they’ll protect the local hospital is important, or what they’ll do  about….  The  things
that matter round here, that’s what I want to talk about”.
Thus we gain an impression of voters being engaged in a campaign, caring about the outcome and
seeing politics as personally relevant to  them.  In  a  vibrant  democracy  this  is  how  an  election
should be viewed, however this is only one perspective; elsewhere the picture is rather bleak.
Disenfranchised and demobilized: the marginalized heartlands
The data from which this section has been developed was conducted during June and July of 2001
in an attempt to assess the attitudes towards New Labour within the party’s traditional  heartlands,
specifically in Barnsley, South Yorkshire. The  research  was  entirely  qualitative  and  conducted
among those who consider themselves as loyal Labour supporters generally but who either did not
or  considered  not  voting  at  the  2001  UK  General  Election.  While  the  data   is   not   strictly
comparable, and was largely regarding the relationship between loyal Labour voters and the  party
(see Lilleker, 2005b), due to the nature of qualitative  focus  groups  many  comments  were  made
about the election as this was fresh in the minds of these members of the electorate  and  was  used
as indicative of the attitude of the party to the constituencies.  The  three  Barnsley  seats,  Central,
East and Mexborough, and West and Penistone, are  all  safe  Labour  seats,  incumbents  enjoying
majorities of 35-40% of the vote, but turnout is low, on  average  48%  in  2005  and  drop  of  one
percent from 2001. Thus is the intention is offer some reasons for  this  in  light  of  the  marketing
and segmentation strategies employed by Labour over the last two elections.
The key, stark difference is the fact that these voters expressed the cynical  and  negative  view  of
politics and election campaigning but related this not to what is heard through the  media,  as  was
largely the case for the Dorset voters, but drew on personal experiences of contact  with  the  party
or, which was more likely, lack of contact with candidates, party workers or the election campaign
at all. Out of 48 participants only one could recall receiving a leaflet, none were  visited,  received
telephone calls or any  of  the  communication  associated  with  the  professional  and  marketised
election campaign. Equally, few had any idea if their MP worked on their behalf as a constituency
representative, on the whole they were unaware of any office hours they may have, those living  in
Barnsley West & Penistone said their MP Michael Clapham did post his hours in the  local  paper,
but none knew if the MP had taken up any case work whatsoever on behalf of a constituent. While
it would be virtually unthinkable for an MP to do no casework, something which most  backbench
MPs like the Barnsley incumbents see now as their priority role (Rush, 2004), it seems they see no
necessity to publicize their activities to their constituents either via the local newspapers,  personal
or party websites, or through newsletters to the  constituency,  tools  used  by  all  incumbents  and
even one of the candidates in the marginal Dorset seats, and had no  budget  to  produce  extensive
literature to advertise their achievements during the election campaign proper.
The  problem  here  though  is  the  attitude  that  this  engenders  among  these  members   of   the
electorate. They feel they are unrepresented, both by the Labour party, which they  felt  should  be
“their party”, “looking after people like me” or “looking after the working class”, but also the  MP
himself. One participant colorfully argued that Barnsley Central MP Jeff Ennis  was  interested  in
“nothing but Jeff Ennis, he buys big houses and feathers his own nest”.  This  was  uncorroborated
and potentially libelous; the problem seems that Ennis does not conduct sufficient communication
with the constituency  to  counter  such  attitudes.  Specifically  talking  about  the  election,  these
voters felt that no-one cared about their vote, it was unimportant and so as a natural corollary  they
were unimportant as citizens. Though using their  own  language  the  majority  expressed  feeling
disenfranchised, while partly the result of the perceived swing  to  the  right  by  the  Labour  Party
under Tony Blair, the lack of reassurance and direct and visible  representation  at  the  local  level
did nothing whatsoever in alleviating these attitudes and feelings. A left-winger residing in Dorset
South expressed similar views about the Labour Party, expressing highly negative  views  towards
most modern politicians, yet he had only positive comments to make about Jim Knight as  his  MP
independent of the fact that he regarded the MP as “ a soft leftie really”. While the Barnsley  focus
group participants were political similar to the Dorset South voter, their negative attitudes towards
politics were not being countered in any way. They felt no reason to vote, that  politicians  did  not
care about them or their area, and the minority who did vote did so only out  of  duty;  one  said  it
was out of solidarity with the Suffragettes only and was applauded for her contribution.
This is a bleak picture, and intentionally so. However it fairly reflects the  attitudes  of  those  who
participated in the Barnsley focus groups. The fact that  turnout  declined  slightly  2001-5  maybe
suggests the picture is unchanged and may explain why Labour’s heartland seats  experienced  the
lowest turnout of all seats nationally;  Conservative  safe  seats  were  on  average  just  above  the
national average at 62%. The fact that the Labour Party are the most professional in their electoral
strategy, and concentrate their campaigning resources carefully (Denver &  Hands,  1997;  Denver
et al, 2001; Hands et al, 2005), there seems to be some correlation here. This paper  suggests  why
this would be the case theoretically in the next section.
Beyond the election campaign: theorizing voter psychology
The first important point to stress is that there is  a  general  and  widespread  negative  reaction  to
political communication. MORI polls consistently show politicians as being on of if  not  the  least
trusted professional groups in the country, this  attitude  was  borne  out  by  the  research  in  both
geographical areas; the only difference was that in the marginal constituencies there was a  feeling
that the incumbent was trustworthy if all others may  not  be.  These  negative  attitudes  lead  to  a
mistrust and so rejection of messages emanating from the political sphere. Election broadcasts  are
viewed, as one Dorset West voter put it, as “empty words strung  together  to  fool  us  they  care”;
advertisements are probably  viewed  similarly,  and  any  talk  of  achievements  are  blocked  out
because of the widespread reaction that “they would  say  that”  consistent  with  mistrust  and  the
lack of perceived credibility political  communication  sources  generally  engender.  Hence  these
negative attitudes act as noise that obstructs a message reaching the intended receivers.
The difference between voters in the marginal seats, where  their  MP  is  highly  visible  and  will  engage  in  a  large
amount of long-term, often face to  face,  communication  with  the  local  electorate,  is  that  they  have  developed  a
relationship with the incumbent. These MPs, and candidates where they have been  in  place  and  campaigning  for  a
significant period prior to  the  campaign  proper,  have  permission  to  contact  the  electorate.  As  a  corollary,  their
communication is not rejected and the messages are retained, considered and effect attitudes  towards  the  democratic
process. The fact that there is a motivation to engage with the campaign means that the minority of voters  who  faced
with a strong permanent campaign reinforced through an intense, on the ground election campaign become  mobilized
and interested, develop a desire  for  the  re-election,  or  election,  of  one  of  the  candidates  and  have  a  far  higher
propensity to vote.
This element of motivation is central to theories of communication processing:  the  cognitive  responses  experienced
by receivers on facing a message. Petty & Cacioppo’s influential Elaboration Likelihood Model  argues  that  in  order
for any receiver to be persuaded by a message they must be motivated to think about  that  message.  This  means  that
the message itself, the style of communication and the source all become bundled together in a  split  second  decision
over whether to read a leaflet, listen to a speaker or engage in a debate. While many potential  receivers  may  pick  up
elements of a campaign via the mass communication, mediated or unmediated, they will  not  have
sufficient motivation to consider  their  electoral  choice  and  will  either  follow  their  traditional
patterns of voting, vote due to perceptions of the  leader  or  a  single  issue  or,  as  is  more  likely
within many safe  seats,  not  bother  voting  at  all.  These  voters  are  less  likely  to  have  strong
attitudes regarding any of the candidates or their parties and, in theory; their  vote  can  be  swayed
by a variety of  factors  relating  to  the  campaign  or  their  experiences  of  politics  and  political
communication more generally.
The strength  of  attitudes  on  the  voter  choices  made  by  both  groups  of  voters  bear  out  this
hypothesis. Among all the voters in  the  Dorset  marginals  there  was  a  strong  positive  attitude
towards the candidate they had chosen, the nature of  representation  within  the  constituency  and
the service they had access to from their MP. The opposite was largely the  case  within  Barnsley.
While many had once considered themselves Labour they indicated they would like an  alternative
but their mistrust prevented them  engaging  with  the  national  campaign  and  so  they  had  little
knowledge of the parties. Equally they felt no  loyalty  to  the  incumbent,  felt  unrepresented  and
largely disenfranchised. The only strong attitude was one of negativity to  the  campaign,  and  the
democratic political process, in general. Hence while one group  felt  the  election  was  important,
the result was interesting to  them  and  they  had  a  desire  to  participate;  in  contrast  the  others
attitudes to the contest are best summed up by one fifty year old  man  who  had  previously  voted
out of duty but decided in 2001 that he saw no good reason to participate: “elections don’t  matter,
they promise stuff but do what they want anyway, as far as I care they can all go to hell”.
Hence, based on the attitudes of these two groups of very different members  of  the  electorate,  it
appears that the choice of whether or not to vote, and then who to vote for, becomes a rational and
reasoned action. For those who feel the  outcome  is  a  foregone  conclusion,  and  who  feel  their
participation will have little or no impact, there is a general attitude that voting is not a worthwhile
activity. The difference within the marginals is that while the national contest  may  well  reaching
an obvious outcome locally it is not. Equally, within the marginals where MPs and in  some  cases
candidates expend much energy proving their worth, constituents can develop a  vested  interested
in the result. Importantly, however, they are also made to feel important. Election  communication
tells  them  their  vote  matters,  the  nature  of  the  campaign  and  the  service  provision   of   the
incumbent makes them feel important as citizens, hence they not only feel a duty to participate but
also a desire to go to the polling booth on election day.
Why the marketplace is undemocratic and democracy is not a marketplace
The  research  presents  a  very  diverse  picture.  In   Dorset   democracy   is   alive,   vibrant   and
participatory; while Barnsley sees disengagement  and  feelings  of  a  lack  of  representation  and
disenfranchisement. At the heart of this is the  logic  of  the  marketplace.  Parties,  like  any  other
advertisers,  are  targeting  their  resources  for  maximum  profit;  while  logical  it  is  against  the
principles of democracy. If political marketing is about more than winning elections,  if  it  is  true
that underpinning a political marketing strategy is providing for the complex needs  and  wants  of
citizens of a democratic nation then such tactics are unacceptable. The rhetorical language used by
Tony Blair in encouraging his MPs and candidates to inspire, enthuse and empower the  electorate
was seemingly followed only where Labour felt they were in danger of losing; suggesting that this
was not about nurturing democratic engagement more widely. Electioneering needs  to  change  to
provide the political marketplace with what it requires.
Politics is essentially bottom up, a concept that is central to the notion of  representation.  Political
marketing has enforced a top down strategic overview of the nation, one that  uses  concepts  such
as target voters, key marginals and which profiles voters on their propensity to participate  and  be
influenced by campaign communication. Such concepts are fine for supermarkets, banks etc,  here
there  is  choice  for  the  consumer.  However,  democracy  does  not  offer  choice  if  voters   are
demobilized and detached from the process of voting. In this way we can argue that democracy  is
not a marketplace, as there are few competitors and a  perception  of  even  less  competing  ideas.
The neo-liberal  managerialism  that  is  central  to  modern  government  leaves  voters  unable  to
distinguish  any  tangible  bases   from   which   to   form   a   choice   and   need   more   not   less
communication. This communication does not solely have to  be  about  local  political  issues  but
also the major issues of  the  day.  Voters  in  Dorset  South  valued  the  opportunity  to  talk  to  a
member of the government about a whole range  of  issues  and  how  a  Labour  government  may
tackle them if elected for a third term, the problem is that these were among  that  minority  of  2%
of all voters who were targeted. Politics, it appears, is now for the few.
In theory an election should be a time when all those who can vote are motivated to consider  their
electoral  choice;  this  is  currently  not  the  case.  The  logic  of  the  marketplace  demands   that
resources are targeted, hence there are few who are cognitively engaged as  the  campaign  is  only
taken to the few; this is incompatible with  democracy.  Hence  this  paper  argues  that  strategists
within nations where first past the post elections  are  the  norm  and  where  there  is  the  need  to
conduct local level election contests must consider not how to target resources most efficiently but
how to reach as many voters as possible independent of who they are.  While  there  may  well  be
those who will never vote regardless, it may also be the case that being engaged by  the  campaign
can weaken the negative attitudes towards politicians that appear prevalent and encourage  greater
long-term interest in the democratic process. What would be  inappropriate  is  for  the  key  target
voters in the marginal seats to remain the only ones who care about the outcome as 741,000 voters
do a not a majority make.
